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Two officers and one able-bodied (AB) seaman were, at the time of the accident, on watch on the bridge, and one engineer and one motorman in the engine room. The system engineer was called in for duty during the night. The master of the ship's alternate crew was also on board on this particular voyage. He was to do an examination for a Pilot Exemption Certificate. He performed no duties during this voyage. There was also a trainee second officer on board.
At 0100 hrs there was a normal watch change for the bridge officers. Normally the relieving officers arrived on the bridge 5 - 10 minutes before the change and the relieved officers left the bridge about 5 minutes after the change.
The trainee second officer, the AB seaman of the watch, the third engineer, the motorman on watch and the system engineer survived. All of them have been interrogated several times by the Commission and the police. The other surviving crew members and passengers have been interrogated by the Estonian, Finnish and Swedish police and some also by Commission members.
6.2.1 Summary of testimonies by the trainee second officer
The trainee second officer was interrogated five times:
1. 29 September 1994 in Turku by the Finnish police.
2. 29 September 1994 in Tallinn by the Estonian police.
3. 7 October 1994 in Tallinn by the Estonian State Security Police.
4. 17 October 1994 in Tallinn by Commission members.
5. 28 August 1996 in Tallinn by the Estonian police.
The basis for the present summary is the earliest testimony. Where subsequent interrogations reveal more information or contradict the earliest testimony, the later testimonies are referred to in square brackets.
The trainee second officer was on board to be trained for deck officer's duty aboard the MARE BALTICUM, a recently acquired passenger ferry. He had passenger cabin number 4103 on deck 4.
He was on the car deck and followed the loading between 1520 hrs and 1830 hrs. Between 1520 hrs and 1845 hrs [4]. All the lorries were lashed down with straps and chocks were used for the cars. Heavy trucks were loaded centre-line aft and smaller trucks and cars at the forward end. Although this witness left shortly before the loading was completed he understood that they were carrying a full load on the car deck. When in Tallinn the ship was without list, but in the open sea, the strong wind caused a starboard list of 2 - 4 degrees.
The trainee second officer went to the bridge at about 2020 hrs. The master together with the master of the alternate crew came up to the bridge after 2100 hrs. Both stayed on the bridge for 20 - 30 minutes.
A large wave hit the ship's port bow at about 2300 hrs. The master arrived on the bridge about 30 minutes later and stayed for 15 minutes. He asked the third officer whether all four engines were running and got an affirmative answer. The trainee second officer then heard the master's order to activate the stabilisers after passing the waypoint. The master left the bridge about 15 minutes before the ESTONIA reached the waypoint. Her speed at this time was 14 - 15 knots. The waves and the wind came from different directions, the wind being more southerly than the waves. The wind was south- west and veering west [4].
After the ESTONIA changed course, the second officer B on the watch told the trainee second officer that the speed was somewhat reduced because of the stabilisers. At about 0000 hrs the sea was heavy.
After the waypoint the AB seaman on watch arrived after completion of his round. He reported that everything was normal but that people were seasick. The trainee second officer left the bridge for his cabin about 0030 hrs or 5 to 10 minutes later. He also said that he left at 0030 hrs when the AB seaman started his next round and that the speed was about 14.5 - 15 knots [4, 5]. He was in his cabin for a couple of minutes and then went to the Pub Admiral. He thought that he saw the AB seaman on watch in the doorway to the bar. In a later testimony [3] he stated that he saw the AB seaman in the staff doorway. He also stated [4] that the time was 0030 - 0040 hrs. He went back to his cabin at about 0050 hrs.
He went to bed but was not yet asleep when, after 5 - 10 minutes, he heard a strange unfamiliar sound which could have been a blow or something like a vibration [4]. He could not say where the sound came from but after this, the ship heeled over to starboard. He got the feeling that something was amiss [2]. He started to dress to get out on deck quickly. Before he had put on his shoes, the list increased and the table slid towards the door.
He left his cabin and found the corridor empty. Up on deck 5 there were some 20 - 30 people running to and fro. While moving between decks 6 and 7 on the main staircase he heard a noise as from a blow and thought this was the noise of trucks moving [4]. The list increased and people were hanging onto the handrail which came loose. People fell to the floor and there was panic. In the staircase several injured people, drunks and half-dressed people were trying to ascend. This was difficult, however, due to the panic. It was also difficult to climb between decks 6 and 7 because the handrail was loose. The witness managed to climb up to deck 7 together with the boatswain [5] and now the list was so great that it was impossible to walk on the carpets, it was difficult even to crawl. They helped each other out to the open deck and he estimated the list at this time to about 45 degrees [5].
On the open deck 7 there were 70 - 100 people; in another testimony he put the number at 150 to 200 [4]. Together with other crew members he started to distribute lifejackets and after a while other crew members started trying to release lifeboats. Others threw lifejackets to people who were unable to climb the stairs.
He left the ship, jumped into the water and looked at his watch which showed 0130 hrs. In other testimonies [3, 4] he has stated that he looked at his watch, ran aft and slid into the water. When he looked at his watch the stern was already under water up to the stabiliser fin [4]. He left the ship when the list was approximately 90 degrees, the stern was into the water and the ship's siren sounded [5]. He came under a liferaft with his lifejacket down around his waist. Because his feet and one hand were tangled in ropes, which he believed belonged to the raft's sea anchor, he was not able to get onto the first raft, which drifted away. Another liferaft drifted towards him upside-down and with the help of a young man he managed to climb on board. On top of this raft there was also a naked elderly man and beneath the raft a Swedish man. They were all rescued by a helicopter at about 0700 hrs.
6.2.2 Summary of testimonies by the able-bodied seaman (AB seaman) on watch
The AB seaman on watch was the only survivor of those on duty on the bridge during the critical hours. His duties were to make 25 - 30-minute rounds in the ship. The round commenced 30 minutes past every hour. During the rounds he was to check the general order and fire safety in the accommodation and on the car deck. Between rounds he was on duty on the bridge as a lookout and handyman.
The AB seaman has been interrogated eight times:
1. 29 September 1994 in Turku by the Finnish police.
2. 29 September 1994 in Turku by Commission members.
3. 3 October 1994 in Tallinn by the Estonian police.
4. 17 October 1994 in Tallinn by Commission members.
5. 17 November 1994 in Tallinn by the Estonian police.
6. 3 December 1994 in Tallinn by the Estonian State Security Police.
7. 31 March 1995 in Gothenburg by Commission members.
8. 25 January 1996 in Tallinn by the Estonian police.
This summary is based on the earliest testimony. When subsequent interrogations reveal more information or contradicts the earliest testimony, the later testimonies are referred to in square brackets.
At 2230 hrs the AB seaman started his regular watch round. The round started from the bridge and he continued to deck 7 where the crew's cabins were. From deck 7 he went to deck 8 to check the rest-rooms and from there down to the car deck where he arrived at about 2235 hrs. On the car deck he checked the lashings which he found were in order, the cargo was not moving. It was stormy weather and he noticed some water coming in through the ventilation channels. This small inflow of water on the car deck was normal during heavy weather and he had seen it earlier. He stayed for about 15 minutes and continued through deck 1 to deck 0 and then back up to the place where his round commenced. Shortly after his arrival on the bridge [5], the master together with the master of the alternate crew arrived and talked in a normal manner with the officers. They left after 5 - 10 minutes.
On the round starting at 0030 hrs, the weather was worse than earlier. In the last testimony [8] the AB seaman said that he was not sure about leaving the bridge at exactly 0030 hrs. In the same testimony he stated that after leaving the bridge he went into cabin 750 and talked to a friend. He stayed less than a minute, saw some friends on deck 7 and stopped to talk to them. Then he went into the laundry room where he collected a jacket, passed two checkpoints and went on into his cabin, where he left the jacket. After that, he went up to deck 8 where he saw some friends in the day room. Without being quite sure about it he thought that he walked further down looking for a girl who worked in the Baltic Bar, but he did not see her. He also stopped at the Pub Admiral to look for another girl.
While he was on the car deck the ship was moving so heavily in all directions that it was difficult to walk and he had to support himself against the bulkheads. When he was approximately one metre from the ramp, a heavy wave hit the bow. He gave the time as 0045 hrs [3]. In another statement [4] he said 0035 hrs at the latest. Later [5] he stated that he was on the car deck between 0035 - 0040 hrs. He also said [6] it was about 0040 hrs. In the last testimony [8] he stated that the time was 0050 - 0055 hrs.
He nearly fell due to the effect of the wave. When the wave struck the bow a particularly ”hard sound” was heard from the bow, a sound that stood out from the others. The sound was accompanied by a heavy vertical ship movement that made him fall [2]. The bow was rising when the blow was heard [4] and continuous heavy waves raised it further.
The blow sounded like two heavy metal pieces clashing together with great force. This lasted for about half a second. He notified the second officer B on watch via portable radio and was ordered to stay and try to determine the source of the sound.
He stayed for a while on the car deck but everything was in order and the visor and the ramp were obviously closed as the signal lamps were green. In another testimony [4] he said that he stayed for 5 minutes, that he checked the lamps and that the ramp was closed. In yet another testimony [7] he stated that he opened a locker to see the lamps, which were green, and that he asked for permission to leave the car deck.
On his round upwards he passed the Baltic Bar [5]. He caught up with the master and entered the bridge just behind him at about 0058 hrs. The watch changed at this time. The master noted that the ship was rolling heavily and that they were behind schedule in spite of having all engines running. He also said that the master said they were one hour behind schedule [4, 7]. In other testimonies [3 and 4] the AB seaman said that he came to the bridge at 0100 hrs, that he could see the top of the jack pole indicating that the visor was there, that the master arrived after him and that the second officer A and the fourth officer were on watch. In still later testimonies the AB seaman stated that prior to his arrival on the bridge the watch had already changed [6] and the relieved officers had left [7]. In his last testimony [8] he said that after leaving the car deck he went to deck 1 and then to his checkpoint in the sauna on deck 0. After that he worked upwards at his normal speed, looked into the Night Club and the Pub Admiral, and continued to the information desk where he looked at a clock which showed about 0100 hrs. Subsequently he went up to the bridge and arrived just behind the master.
When the AB seaman came up to the bridge, the second officer had received a telephone call from below, saying that strange blows had been heard from below. In a later testimony [2] he stated that the second officer A said that he had had a telephone call about noise from the ”bow door”. The AB seaman also stated [8] that the 2nd officer A had a telephone call from the engine room about heavy blows. The second officer A ordered the AB seaman to go down to the car deck to check the ”bow doors” and also to take a look at the general situation. In another testimony [4] the AB seaman said that there were strange blows from below and that he got an order to check the ramp together with the boatswain, and that this happened less than 10 minutes past one o'clock. He also stated [5] that he and the boatswain were ordered to go down together to check some blows. Later [6] he said that they got orders to go down and check the ramp. In a still later testimony [7] he said that he was ordered to check the ramp and visor together with the boatswain and to see that they were properly secured, and he also stated that the orders were given in a routine manner. He tried unsuccessfully to contact the boatswain via portable VHF radio. He told the second officer A that he could not reach the boatswain. The second officer said he would telephone the boatswain in his cabin. It was an unusual step to wake the boatswain, but he was the crew member responsible for both visor and ramp [7]. The AB seaman stayed less than 2 minutes on the bridge before being ordered down again [7].
When he was on his way down, people were already asking for help because the ship's list was so heavy that some could no longer manage to walk. In the last testimony [8] he stated that he helped two passengers on deck 7 who had fallen over. He also stated [2] that he noticed a slight list on his way to the car deck. In another testimony [7] he said that he ran down straight from the bridge to the information desk. He also stated [8] that on his way down he passed the Baltic Bar and looked through the door for a friend. He couldn't see his friend but observed that the musicians had stopped playing.
The situation calmed down somewhat when the ship heeled over to starboard. He ran to the information desk on deck 5 to ask them to unlock the car deck doors because he had been ordered to go there. He did not yet think that the ship would go down. In the last testimony [8] he said that when he arrived at the information desk the girl there was exchanging money for a passenger. The AB seaman had to wait for a couple of minutes. While he was waiting, the ship heeled over so much that all objects fell. He continued down to deck 4 where the staircase was full of people and he realised that the situation had become serious. The list was now around 25 - 30 degrees.
He ran to deck 7 and tried to reach the outer deck but fell. Lying on the deck he reported to the officer on watch over his portable radio that people were screaming in panic, saying that ”deck 1 is under water”. In another interrogation he stated that the people said ”there is water on deck 1” [2] and in a further interrogation he stated that one passenger, either from cabin 1069 or 1096, had told him that there was water on deck 1 [6]. This was new information to the bridge [5]. The bridge was surprised by this information [6].The officer ordered him to go down and check the situation even though the AB seaman thought that the situation was hopeless.
He managed to support his feet against the bulkhead and to give some lifejackets to passengers. Out on deck he realised that he had lost his portable radio [5].
When the ship heeled over ”altogether”, he managed to save himself by getting to a liferaft on the ship's side. At this moment the funnel and three quarters of the ship were already under water. In a later testimony [7] he said that he was in the liferaft at 0124 hrs and that the ship had a 90-degree list when he left. In the last testimony [8] he said that he looked at his watch several times after midnight because he was instructed to do so while on duty. At 0125 hrs the ship's bottom was upwards and he was floating on a raft.
When the AB seaman slid into the water he lost contact with one of his friends. He fell into the sea from the raft but someone pulled him back again. He also managed to pull two girls into the raft.
When the ship sank it turned upside down and went down stern first. He noticed that the bow visor was missing.
6.2.3 Summary of testimonies by the third engineer
The third engineer was interrogated seven times:
1. 29 September 1994 in Turku by the Finnish police.
2. 29 September 1994 in Turku by the Estonian State Security Police.
3. 29 September 1994 in Turku by Commission members.
4. 3 October 1994 in Tallinn by the Estonian police.
5. 17 October 1994 in Tallinn by Commission members.
6. 31 March 1995 in Gothenburg by Commission members.
7. 28 February 1996 in Tallinn by the Estonian police.
This summary is based on the earliest testimony. When subsequent interrogations reveal more information or contradict the earliest testimony, the later testimonies are referred to in square brackets.
During the loading of the ESTONIA the third engineer heard on his portable VHF radio the order from the chief officer that the cars must be carefully lashed because hard weather was expected.
The third engineer was on duty from 0000 hrs. His work station was the engine control room. Wind velocity was 20 - 25 m/s (according to the ship's anemometer) and the ship's speed 15 knots. The run seemed normal despite the heavy weather. At 0030 hrs [3, 5] the stabilisers were activated.
When he started his watch he looked at the instrument panel and observed that the ship had a starboard list of approximately one degree. The fourth engineer, who had the watch before the third engineer's, told him that he had tried to compensate for the list, which was due to the distribution of the cargo, by filling the port heeling tank. However, the tank was already full and the list could not be fully compensated.
In the control room there was a monitor connected to video cameras on the car deck and in the engine room. The cameras scanned automatically every five seconds but it was possible to stop the scan manually and to keep a desired picture.
He saw on the monitor that the AB seaman on the watch was on the car deck at about 0100 hrs or five minutes later [4]. In another testimony [7] he stated the time to be 0055 - 0059 hrs, that he saw the AB seaman at the ramp and that there was no water at this time.
At 0115 hrs he perceived two heavy waves, one after another, and they could really be felt. Later he stated that the time was 0110 hrs [2], 0114 hrs [6] and also that he looked at his watch which said 0113 hrs [7]. He had never before experienced such powerful blows against a ship. The ship was sailing practically straight into the waves and consequently their full force was directed towards the bow. He immediately looked in the monitor. At 0115 hrs he saw in the monitor [2] that water was coming in from the bow or - as stated in another testimony [4] - that a huge amount of water was pressing in from the sides of the ramp. At the same moment he heard the AB seaman on the watch report ”water on the car deck”. In other testimonies [3, 5] he said that the AB seaman's words were ”Bridge from watchkeeping seaman: there is water on the car deck”. The inflow of water was enormous. In fact, the monitor picture became unclear because the camera was sprayed with water. He locked the camera on the ramp and, according to him, the same picture was displayed on the bridge monitor [5].
The effect of the inflow of water was immediate, the ship developing a 2 - 3 degree list to starboard. She also started to roll, 3 degrees to starboard and 1.5 degrees to port [6]. Then she heeled even more to starboard and subsequently the starboard list became permanent. Loose objects started to move. At this time the system engineer and the motorman entered the control room.
Within a couple of minutes the list increased to 10 - 15 degrees while the ship continued with all four main engines and two auxiliary engines still running. At this time the fourth officer called and asked if the list could be adjusted by increasing the amount of water in the port heeling tank. In a later testimony [2] he said that this question was asked at about 0120 hrs. In another testimony [5] he stated that the time was 0121 hrs and that he heard the alarm - Mr Skylight to number one and two - at the same time. He tried to pump in sea water, hoping that the list might have created some space in the tank but the pump only sucked air. From this time on, the starboard list increased rapidly [2].
Approximately one minute after the alarm Mr Skylight to number one and two, the boat alarm went out over the public address system and the alarm bells started to ring [6].
Within a couple of minutes the ship had developed a 20 - 25-degree list to starboard and the port main engines tripped because of an automatic shutdown, i.e. the lubrication system was no longer working. When this happened the list was 30 - 35 degrees and he tried to restart the engines but without success [2]. The ship's speed was then 5 - 6 knots. Some minutes later, engine no 4 tripped for the same reason and after a while also no 3. The time was then 0120 - 0125 hrs [5]. He reported to the fourth officer via portable radio that the main engines had tripped [4]. They were running at 560 rpm before the accident and around 500 rpm before they stopped [5]. In another testimony [6] he stated that the engines were running at approximately 400 rpm. With the help of railings, he crawled to the control panel and tried to restart the engines [6].
He sent the motorman up when the engines had tripped because the motorman was in a state of near panic. In a later testimony [3] he said that he sent the motorman to the bridge to report. The system engineer left the control room at the same time.
At about 0130 hrs the list was approximately 40 - 45 degrees. At this moment the auxiliary engines also stopped and the emergency generator on deck 8 started automatically. In a later testimony [6] he stated that the list was around 70 degrees when the auxiliary engines stopped. The fourth officer also contacted him at this point and asked if it was possible to pump out fresh water into the sea from the tanks on the starboard side. This was no longer possible due to lack of electric power.
The third engineer felt there was nothing he could do in the control room any more and told the bridge that he was going up on deck to check the function of the emergency diesel generator [2, 7]. When he left the control room there was no water there and all watertight doors were closed. In a later testimony [5] he said that he left at about 0130 hrs and that the list was at this time 70 - 75 degrees. He also said that he left about 0125 hrs, not earlier because he then looked at his watch for the last time [7].
The third engineer took the engine staff's own staircase to deck 8, to the emergency diesel generator. On his way up he heard noises indicating that the cargo was moving. He checked the emergency generator, which was still running. The ship was at this time lying on her side, i.e. the list was 90 degrees. Because of this, the emergency generator shut down almost immediately. He had no more duties and moved aft along the hull where there was a crowd of people. When the emergency diesel generator stopped, the hard plastic flooring on deck was falling over him [6]. (This flooring consisted of 30x30-centimetre 14-millimetre-thick, structured polypropylene tiles that snapped together.)
He saw that some passengers had opened liferaft containers but that they did not know what to do with the rafts. He went to help, but at the same moment a wave washed him into the sea.
He was not wearing a lifejacket but he found two which he put on. He found a damaged lifeboat, floating upside down, with four people sitting on it. He managed to climb on. After a while another person also got up on this lifeboat but this person later died.
At a distance of about 80 metres he saw the ship go down. She was lying on her starboard side as she sank, stern first. During the last few moments the bow pointed upwards at 45 degrees.
He observed that the bow visor was missing and assumed that the heavy waves had torn it away.
The third engineer assumed that he was one of the first to be rescued. He and the others from a lifeboat were picked up by a helicopter at about 0350 hrs [2].
6.2.4 Summary of testimonies by the system engineer
The system engineer was interrogated five times.
1. 28 September 1994 in Turku by the Finnish police.
2. 29 September 1994 in Turku by members of the Commission.
3. 29 September 1994 in Turku by the Estonian police.
4. 10 October 1994 in Tallinn by the Estonian State Security Police.
5. 13 January 1996 in Tallinn by the Estonian police.
This summary is based on the earliest testimony. When subsequent interrogations reveal more information or contradict the earliest testimony, the later testimonies are referred to in square brackets.
The system engineer was asleep in his cabin and was called on duty at about 0030 hrs by the third engineer due to vacuum problems and subsequent difficulties in emptying one of the toilets. In a later testimony he said he was called at 0045 hrs [5]. He arrived in the engine room on deck 0 at about 0045 hrs to solve the problem. He felt a couple of hard shakes when a wave hit the bow. The shakes were stronger than usual for this kind of weather. He concluded that the weather was foul.
It took about 20 to 25 minutes to find the cause of the vacuum problem and make the necessary repairs [3]. He stayed in the engine room for about 25 minutes [4]. Later in the same testimony he specified that he did not leave the engine room until he realised that the ship was going to sink.
On finding the cause of the problem, which was air entering the vacuum system, he felt that something was amiss because the ship heeled over to starboard. In a later testimony [3] he stated that he felt two or three heavy blows and that the electrical panels started to shake in their fastenings. After these blows, the ship started to heel and some cans slid about. After the next blow, the cans, which had stopped, started to roll to the other side. In a later testimony [5] he said that he heard a heavy blow, heavier than from a wave. Less than a minute later a new blow came and the ship started to heel.
Because of the list he went to the engine control room where the third engineer and the motorman were. The move took about two minutes. The surveillance monitor showed a great deal of water entering the car deck from both sides of the ramp, possibly more from starboard than from port. He was not able to tell whether water was also coming in from the top of the ramp because the camera did not cover this area. Shortly after his arrival in the control room, the watertight doors were closed.
In later testimony [5] he said he went to the control room one or two minutes after the list. The third engineer ordered him to check the car deck with the surveillance camera. The cars were in place and he could not see any water on the deck but water was pressed in at the ramp. He was sure that the third engineer also saw this, presumably before himself.
In the latest testimony [5] the system engineer made a drawing to illustrate what he saw in the surveillance monitor (Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1 Drawing made by the system engineer showing what he saw in the surveillance monitor.
The three wondered if the bow visor had opened because this amount of water could not possibly enter only because of some damaged seals. The water was entering continuously and not only in connection with waves. The ship developed a 30 - 40-degree list and the engines tripped, first two and then the third and finally the last remaining engine. The system engineer did not know if all four auxiliary engines were working or only two of them.
While still in the control room, the system engineer heard the bridge ask if it was possible to right the ship. He thought that the third engineer had by that time informed the bridge about water entering the car deck. The pumps were running to drain the water. The bridge also asked if it was possible to reduce the list by pumping water between the heeling tanks. While the system engineer was following the events on the monitor he was unable to hear the third engineer's reply.
He wanted to call the chief engineer but before he could reach the telephone everything fell over. He managed to crawl to the central table but this broke loose from its welds [5].
After the engines had stopped he heard the alarm Mr Skylight to number one and two over the public address system and soon after that the watertight doors were closed and the boat alarm sounded. He asked the third engineer what was going on and why the water was coming in, which he was able to see on the monitor, but got no reply [4]. Later in this testimony he clarified that he did not observe any water entering the car deck, only that the third engineer told him about it.
When the list was about 45 - 50 degrees, he and the motorman left the control room. At that point the electric power was still on. In a later testimony [2] he said that they left when the list was about 60 degrees and that he, on the monitor, saw the cars shifting approximately one metre to starboard when the ship was at about 45 degrees of list. When he had reached deck 6, the auxiliary engines stopped and after two or three seconds the emergency generator started and the power came on again. The system engineer, together with the motorman, gained the outer deck 8 amidships, quite near the emergency generator which worked until the list was about 90 degrees. Their climb, he stated, took one minute or two [5].
Out on deck 8 he saw crew members preparing liferafts in case the ship should turn over. By this time the list was already too heavy to permit the release of lifeboats. People had released inflatable rafts on the ship's port side and were able to slide into the sea when the list increased.
When the ship was practically on its side, a typhoon signal was given. This meant that everybody had to save themselves. In a later testimony [2] the witness stated that there was a message over the public address system, advising passengers in the water to stay clear of the sinking vessel. He also stated [3] that he saw the second and third officers leave the bridge at that time and start helping to release rafts. At that moment the system engineer was together with other people, mostly crew members. They waited for a relatively safe moment and slid into the water in a raft, holding on to ropes.
When the ESTONIA sank, stern first, he could see that the bow visor was missing. He was about 20 metres from the ship in a raft together with 9 to 10 others. He has estimated that the time from his first observation of water entering the car deck to the sinking was 15 - 20 minutes.
In the raft he, together with the AB seaman and the motorman, helped others aboard and finally they were 16 people. The last person got into the raft about two hours after the sinking; in a later testimony [4] he said 1.5 hours.
At 0815 hrs the system engineer together with the others was rescued by two helicopters.
6.2.5 Summary of testimonies by the motorman
The motorman was interrogated three times:
1. 29 September 1994 in Turku by the Estonian State Security Police.
2. 29 September 1994 in Turku by Commission members.
3. 31 March 1995 in Gothenburg by Commission members.
This summary is based on the earliest testimony. When subsequent interrogations reveal more information or contradict the earliest testimony, the later testimonies are referred to in square brackets.
This was the motorman's first voyage as a crew member on the ESTONIA [2]. He was on duty that night from 0000 hrs together with his supervisor, the third engineer. When on duty, he made a round in the engine room and checked that everything was working normally. After the round he went to the control room and the third engineer made his round. During the third engineer's round the motorman received an order from the bridge to activate the stabilisers.
At about 0046 hrs the motorman saw on the monitor that there was a small trickle of water pouring in on the starboard side of the ramp. He thought it was rain which had penetrated the seal. On this occasion he was alone in the control room and when the third engineer returned the motorman went to an adjacent workshop. In a later testimony [3] the motorman, questioned about seeing water entering at 0046 hrs, stated that he had since given it much thought but that he was no longer sure of having seen it. After further questioning on this topic, he stated that he was no longer certain of having said so at all in the first testimony.
While he was working in the workshop, the ship suddenly developed a list which he found strange. He went to the control room and the 3rd engineer told him that the situation was serious because a wave had broken the ramp. On the monitor he saw that there were big waves on the car deck and that the water surface was level with the cars. Right after this, several lamps started to flash ”boat alarm”, meaning an order to the lifeboat groups to man the lifeboat stations.
At this time the system engineer arrived and the watertight doors had been closed. The water pumps were turned on and from the bridge they received orders to try to do something with the pumps. At this time the list increased and because loose objects started to move it was no longer possible to stand upright. At a certain point the main engines tripped. The motorman also heard noises of movement on the car deck. It was now obvious to everyone that the ship was going down.
Then the motorman and the system engineer left the control room through the emergency exit. The list at this time was about 50 degrees [2]. When they were on their way up, the auxiliary engines stopped and the emergency generator started automatically. The list was about 90 degrees when they reached deck 8 and at that time the emergency generator stopped. The motorman put on a lifejacket and slid into the water where he saw the ship sinking stern first. He could see that the bow visor was missing.
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