 |
7.2.1 General
The basis of the international rules covering the search for and rescue of human beings at sea is the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the SAR Convention). This entered into force in 1985 and Sweden and Finland have ratified it. Some of the Convention's provisions deal with the organisation of maritime rescue services and international co-operation in this respect. These include the decision to establish Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) in agreement with neighbouring countries, each with at least one Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC), and if necessary subordinate centres known as Maritime Rescue Subcentres (MRSC).
The Convention also contains provisions governing the duties and operational procedures of these rescue centres. According to the provisions an MRCC is “a unit responsible for promoting efficient organisation of search and rescue (SAR) services and for co-ordinating the conduct of SAR operations within an SRR”. If the position of the ship is known the responsibility for initiating SAR operation will be that of the MRCC or MRSC in which area the ship is located.
As well as in the SAR Convention, the tasks of an MRCC are laid down in the IMO Search and Rescue Manual and in national provisions. Some of their main tasks are summarised below:
- An MRCC prepares detailed plans for conduct of SAR operations in its own area. Each MRCC and MRSC maintains up-to-date information relevant to SAR operations in its area.
- An MRCC should be in a constant state of operational readiness.
- When an MRCC receives a distress signal, it must establish the facts of the situation, so as to determine the state of emergency and decide on the extent of the operation required.
- The MRCC initiates and co-ordinates the operation through the available rescue units in accordance with a plan of action.
- The MRCC notifies the owner of the vessel and the appropriate authorities of the operations being launched. Other MRCCs and MRSCs and rescue units which may be concerned must also be notified and kept informed of developments.
- When the emergency no longer exists, or further search seems useless, the MRCC terminates the operation and notifies the authorities and individuals who had previously been informed.
- The sphere of authority of the MRCC in each country is established by national provisions.
The IMO Search and Rescue Manual (IMOSAR) is a supplement to the SAR Convention. It provides guidelines for a common maritime SAR policy, encouraging all coastal states to develop their organisations on similar lines and enabling adjacent states to co-operate and provide mutual assistance.
The IMO Merchant Ship Search and Rescue Manual (MERSAR) is a second manual based on the SAR Convention. This contains guidelines for masters of ships that may be called upon to act in connection with SAR operations.
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is the most important convention dealing with maritime safety. It contains provisions concerning the responsibility of the master of a ship when he becomes aware of an emergency at sea involving a risk to human life. It also enjoins each Contracting Government to ensure that any necessary arrangements are made for coast watching and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea around its coast.
The Radio Regulations (RR) appurtenant to the International Telecommunication Convention contain provisions governing communications in a distress situation.
7.2.2 Finland
General
At the time of the accident the rescue services in Finland consisted of three parts, the General Rescue Service, the Aeronautical SAR Service, and the Maritime SAR Service.
The Ministry of the Interior was responsible for the general management and co-ordination of the rescue services.
The General Rescue Service covered operations related to fires and general rescue operations carried out by the local rescue services, such as the fire brigades, the police, the medical centres and ambulance units as well as the auxiliary volunteer organisations, e.g. the National Commission for Volunteer SAR Services. The Finnish Lifeboat Society co-ordinated voluntary SAR services at sea.
The Aeronautical SAR Service covered rescue operations concerning aircraft or carried out with aircraft. It also supported the General Rescue Service and the Maritime SAR Service. The responsible authority for the Aeronautical SAR services was the Civil Aviation Administration, under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
The Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) for Southern Finland was in Tampere.
Maritime SAR service
The maritime SAR operations in Finland were governed by the Maritime Search and Rescue Act and Decree. The Act and Decree defined the authorities which had to participate in maritime SAR services and their following functions:
- The Frontier Guard carried out mari-time SAR operations and attended to the planning, management and supervision of maritime SAR services as well as to the co-ordination of the operation.
- The Defence Forces watched over marine areas in order to detect and locate emergencies. It also participated in SAR operations.
- The National Maritime Administration attended to distress and safety communications and to the co-ordination of these, and participated in SAR services operations.
- The police, the National Board of Customs, the Road Administration and the local rescue authorities participated in SAR operations.
- The health care authorities attended to the medical aspects of rescue operations.
- The aviation authorities participated in maritime rescue operations through the aeronautical SAR organisation.
- Helsinki Radio was a national coast radio station, owned by Telecom Finland, from which the National Maritime Administration purchased distress and safety radio communication services.
MRCC and MRSC
Finland's SRR encompassed Finnish territorial waters as well as international waters as agreed with neighbouring countries. The region was divided into three maritime rescue regions, each with its own MRCC, situated in Helsinki, Turku and Vaasa. The accident took place in the Archipelago Sea Maritime SRR, under MRCC Turku.
Each MRCC was operated by the Frontier Guard. MRCC Helsinki was manned by staff of the headquarters of its Gulf of Finland Coast Guard Section, MRCC Turku by those of the headquarters of its Archipelago Sea Coast Guard Section and MRCC Vaasa by those of the headquarters of its Gulf of Bothnia Coast Guard Section. Each MRCC was headed by a commander of the coast guard section or an officer designated by him and assisted when necessary by a maritime rescue expert group. This group consisted of the authorities mentioned in the Maritime SAR Decree, representatives of volunteer SAR services, and other experts as needed.
Under MRCC Turku there were MRSC Mariehamn and MRSC Turku. MRSC operations were directed by the commander of the respective coast guard sub-district, assisted when necessary by an expert group. MRSC Turku located at Pärnäinen in the island of Nauvo, was a combined maritime traffic and coast guard centre also known as Turku Radio.
The MRCCs were manned around the clock to a readiness to receive distress messages 24 hours a day and initiate rescue operations. During office hours, two to three persons worked in an MRCC, a duty officer (DO), a radio operator and the chief officer of the centre. Outside office hours the practice varied, with one or two persons, depending on the resources of the coast guard section. However, the radio operators worked in regular shifts. A stand-by duty officer (SDO) and a coast guard emergency duty officer (EDO) were on stand-by at home, ready to arrive for advanced operational management at one hour's notice.
Outside office hours an MRSC was manned by only one person. However, MRSC Turku, as a maritime traffic centre and rescue subcentre, was manned by two.
Planning for major accidents
In each SRR there was a plan outlining operations in the event of a major accident. For the Archipelago Sea Maritime SRR the major accident rescue plan was adopted on 18 June 1991. The main elements of the plan were risk assessments, the basis for SAR operations, the SAR plan, communications and public information. Separate annexes included diagrams and illustrations of the chain of command for SAR, alarm arrangements, assembly points and radio communications.
The applicability of the plan had been tested in several SAR exercises involving simulated accidents to passenger ferries.
The tasks of the rescue leaders of MRCC Turku according to the plan were (Supplement):
the duty officer
- to know the readiness situation of the rescue units,
- to keep a radio log of communications traffic and mark the information on the situation map,
- to order the most rapidly operational maritime rescue units to the scene of an accident, (to conduct rescue operations and obtain a detailed assessment of the situation,
- to alert the SDO and the EDO,
- to start general alerting according to the alarm diagram,
- to order the latest weather reports and forecasts, and to order drift calculations if needed.
the stand-by duty officer
- to alert further resources if needed,
- to alert the commander and other necessary personnel,
- to inform the headquarters of the frontier guard, the adjacent coast guard section, the Ministry of Environment and the shipping company affected,
- to draft a press release and publish it.
the emergency duty officer
- to lead the operation as an assistant or deputy to the commander,
- to organise the work of the maritime rescue expert group,
- to inform neighbouring states.
Further tasks were addressed to the MRCC generally, not assigned to individuals.
Other rescue resources
When operating at sea, coast guard vessels, patrol boats and helicopters were at the highest readiness to participate in SAR missions. Maritime SAR helicopters at base during office hours were on almost immediate take-off alert. At other times, on-duty helicopters were at the highest readiness (one hour).
7.2.3 Sweden
The basis for Sweden's maritime SAR services - in addition to the international conventions mentioned under 7.2.1 - was the 1986 Swedish Rescue Act which was drafted to correspond with these conventions. The maritime SAR service was one part of the national SAR services.
The National Maritime Administration was responsible for Sweden's maritime SAR service.
Maritime SAR operations in Sweden's SRR in the northern Baltic were conducted and co-ordinated by MRCC Stockholm located at Telia Mobitel AB's coast radio station in Stockholm. Under contract to the Maritime Administration, Telia Mobitel AB provided distress and safety watch-keeping as well as maritime SAR co-ordination services. In the event of a maritime SAR effort the coast radio station personnel could be used to support MRCC normal manning in accordance with an agreed personnel plan. The MRCC was always manned by a maritime SAR duty officer and a deputy duty officer. Another deputy was on thirty minutes stand-by.
The maritime rescue units used consisted of state-owned vessels, helicopters and aircraft, and vessels belonging to the Swedish Sea Rescue Institution. Both the Navy and the Air Force had helicopters suitable for maritime SAR missions (Boeing Kawasaki 107 and Super Puma, respectively).
The Aeronautical Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) was at Arlanda Airport outside Stockholm. ARCC Arlanda commanded all military helicopters in SAR operations and was responsible for alerting civilian air units.
To co-ordinate rescue operations, primarily on land, and to provide alarm services, a publicly-owned special company had been formed, SOS Alarm. This company had 20 SOS centres, together covering the whole of Swedish territory. Each regional centre had agreements with the regional medical services on the basis of which they could alert hospitals and prepare them when a major accident had happened.
7.2.4 Estonia
In Estonia the National Maritime Administration was responsible for the SAR operations at sea in accordance with the Estonian Merchant Shipping Code. To perform this function, the Maritime Administration established the Coast Guard Department, which besides maritime SAR matters also dealt with the localisation and combating of marine pollution.
Although Estonia had not ratified the SAR Convention before the accident, the coast guard service acted in accordance with the Convention as closely as possible.
The MRCC was situated in Tallinn and was manned round the clock. If the situation called for it, the co-ordinators called in other experts.
MRCC Tallinn carried out maritime SAR operations in co-operation with the National Border Guard Administration, the Estonian State Sea Inspection Agency, the Estonian Lifesaving Association, the Estonian National Rescue Board and ARCC Tallinn.
7.2.5 Co-operation
Finland and Sweden
An agreement between Finland and Sweden on maritime and aeronautical SAR and a protocol thereto entered into force on 20 March 1994. This agreement replaced one of 1982.
The agreement states that the border between the maritime and aeronautical rescue services of the respective countries is also the border of the flight information regions (FIR). It also covers notification, mutual assistance, joint rescue exercises, regular tests of the communications between the states, mutual visits of rescue service experts and exchange of information and experience on rescue services.
Co-operation since 1982 has included maritime SAR exercises in 1990 and 1992 concerning simulated accidents to passenger ferries.
Practical SAR co-operation has primarily been between MRCC Turku and MRCC Stockholm. MRSC Mariehamn has been in frequent contact with MRCC Stockholm, primarily in connection with maritime SAR in the Åland Sea and the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia.
Finland and Estonia
Finland and Estonia entered into an interim agreement on maritime SAR on 15 June 1992, under which the border between the rescue areas is the same as the border between the respective flight information regions (FIR). The arrangements regarding operational and notification obligations in the event of a maritime emergency are the same as in the agreement between Finland and Sweden.
In addition to this agreement, the Finnish Frontier Guard and the Estonian Border Guard concluded on 24 May 1994 a protocol on co-operation in saving human lives at sea and on the related air operations.
Estonia appointed the National Maritime Administration as responsible maritime SAR authority and the Coast Guard operations centre as MRCC Tallinn with effect from 1 January 1993.
The bodies responsible for practical operations are the headquarters of the Gulf of Finland Coast Guard Section and the headquarters of the Estonian Border Guard.
The arrangements for meetings between representatives of the respective parties are the same as in the agreement between Finland and Sweden.
After the interim agreement entered into force, a joint maritime rescue exercise concerning a simulated accident to a passenger ferry off Helsinki was organised jointly by Finland, Estonia and the Russian Federation on 21 October 1992.
Between 1992 and 1994 Finnish and Estonian maritime rescue authorities and volunteers have met considerably more often than required by the agreement, to develop co-operation in maritime SAR matters.
Sweden and Estonia
At the time of the accident there were no maritime SAR co-operation agreements between Sweden and Estonia.
However, since 1991 Sweden has trained personnel from Estonia in SAR management and co-ordination. Courses and seminars have been conducted in Sweden and Estonia.
|
|
|
7.3.1 The maritime radio systems
The SOLAS convention requires that all passenger vessels on international voyages and all cargo vessels of at least 300 tons gross are equipped with a maritime radio station for distress and safety. There are two maritime radio systems in use, an old one here termed the pre-Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (pre-GMDSS), and a new one, the GMDSS. All vessels and coast radio stations must change to the GMDSS during a transition period ending on 1 February 1999. During this period, vessels may be equipped with either system.
In the old system the radio station on board a vessel may be either a radiotelegraph station or a radiotelephone station. The international distress and safety frequencies are: 500 kHz for radiotelegraphy and 2182 kHz and VHF channel 16 for radiotelephony. In a radiotelegraph station all these frequencies are required and a vessel must carry a radio officer holding a radiotelegraph operator's certificate. For radiotelephone stations the telephone frequencies are required and the station is operated by deck officers holding a radiotelephone operator's general certificate (GOC).
In the GMDSS every ship while at sea shall be capable of transmitting ship-to-shore distress alerts by at least two separate and independent means. Therefore the equipment of the radio station on board a vessel is governed by the sea area of sailing. Four sea areas exist: A1 (VHF communication), A2 (MF communication), A3 (satellite communication) and A4 (HF communication). All ships must also be capable of receiving shore-to-ship distress alerts, and of transmitting and receiving ship-to-ship distress alerts and SAR co-ordinating communications. Except when satellite communications are used, the communication is initiated with a digital selective call (DSC), which is received fully automatically by other stations. The international distress and safety frequencies for DSC are: VHF channel 70, MF 2187.5 kHz, and five frequencies in the HF band. After contact by DSC the stations shift to the distress and safety frequencies for radiotelephony: on VHF to channel 16 and on MF to 2182 kHz. The radio station on board a vessel is operated by deck officers holding a general operator's certificate or a restricted operator's certificate (ROC).
A reserve source of electrical power must be provided on every ship to supply the radio installation, for conducting distress and safety radio communication in the event of failure of the ship's main and emergency power sources.
In both systems, the radio equipment on board a vessel also includes an emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB). The EPIRB is a small radio buoy of “float-free” structure. If the vessel sinks, the buoy is released, rises to the surface and begins to transmit a distress alert. Three (or two) portable VHF radiotelephones are also required. They can accompany the lifeboats or liferafts when the vessel is abandoned.
With the pre-GMDSS a vessel in distress alerts primarily other vessels in the vicinity. With the GMDSS the intention is for the distress alert always to be routed to shore, primarily to rescue co-ordination centres. At the same time, other vessels in the vicinity will be alerted. Both systems can be used to transmit, on behalf of others, a distress message - Mayday Relay (pre-GMDSS) or Distress Alert Relay (GMDSS) - e.g. when the vessel in distress cannot itself transmit a message or when further assistance is required.
Distress traffic must always be initiated by using the procedures specified by the Radio Regulations. With the old system for radiotelegraphy on 500 kHz, a radiotelegraph alarm signal must be transmitted, and for radiotelephony on 2182 kHz, a radiotelephone alarm signal must be transmitted. The purpose of the alarm signals is to arise attention and to turn on the muted loudspeakers of the radiotelegraph and radiotelephone auto alarm receivers keeping automatic watch on 500 kHz and 2182 kHz, respectively. After the alarm signal, a distress call is transmitted, followed by the distress message. On VHF channel 16, only a distress call and a distress message are transmitted.
In the GMDSS the distress traffic is initiated on 2187.5 kHz and VHF channel 70 by transmitting a distress alert using DSC. After DSC acknowledgement, primarily by a coast station, the distress traffic is shifted to the radiotelephone distress and safety frequency on the band where the acknowledgement was received.
The ESTONIA was equipped in compliance with the old system with a radiotelegraph station and a radiotelephone system. The radio installation and the competence of those serving it satisfied the SOLAS requirements. For details of the equipment, see 3.2.9. Regarding the formal competence of the crew, see 4.2.2. In addition various crew members had some 30 - 35 portable VHF maritime radiotelephones (including channel 16) not indicated in the vessel's radio licence.
The radio officer of the ESTONIA had special watchkeeping hours, 1900 - 0100 hrs, during which he kept watch on the radiotelegraph distress and safety frequency 500 kHz. At other times, the frequency was monitored by a radiotelegraph auto alarm. The radiotelephone frequencies 2182 kHz and VHF channel 16 were monitored on the bridge.
7.3.2 Distress and safety watch
Vessels
Every vessel at sea must keep continuous radio watch for distress and safety. Vessels with radiotelegraph stations keep watch 500 kHz, 2182 kHz and VHF channel 16. The frequency 500 kHz is watched by a radio officer or by the radiotelegraph auto alarm, while 2182 kHz is watched with a loudspeaker, filtered loudspeaker or muted loudspeaker on the bridge. This latter method where the equipment functions as a radiotelephone auto alarm is the most common. VHF channel 16 is watched on the bridge. Vessels with radiotelephone stations keep continuous watch on 2182 kHz and VHF channel 16 as above. Vessels with GMDSS radio stations keep automatic watch by DSC on the bridge on VHF channel 70 and, if the radio installation is for other sea areas than A1, also on 2187.5 kHz. During the transition period - ending in February 1999 - GMDSS vessels must also keep watch on 2182 kHz and VHF channel 16.
Coast stations
Several rescue co-ordination centres and other coast stations keep continuous watch on 2182 kHz and VHF channel 16. Some rescue co-ordination centres and many other coast stations keep watch on 500 kHz. At the beginning of 1993, the Finnish Maritime Administration established sea area A2 covering the Gulf of Finland, the Northern Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia. Continuous distress and safety watch is kept on 2187.5 kHz by DSC, by the Finnish rescue co-ordination centres and by Helsinki Radio.
At night the radio traffic in the Baltic area on distress frequencies 500 kHz, 2182 kHz and 2187.5 kHz can usually be received throughout the entire Baltic, unless the frequencies are badly disturbed. The ranges over which messages may be transmitted on the VHF channels depend greatly on the structure and height of the antenna and are normally under 100 km.
According to the List of Coast Stations at least the stations given in Table 7.1 were keeping watch on the distress and safety frequencies in the Baltic on the night of the accident.
Table 7.1 Stations keeping watch on the night of the accident.
| Coast station | 500
kHz | 2182
kHz | VHF
16 | DSC
2187.5
kHz | DSC
VHF
70 |
| Helsinki Radio, Finland (controlled also Mariehamn Radio) | X | X | X | X | |
| MRCC Turku, Finland | | X | X | X | |
| MRSC Turku, Finland | | X | X | X | |
| MRCC Helsinki, Finland | | X | X | X | |
| MRCC Vaasa, Finland | | X | X | X | |
| Tallinn Radio, Estonia | X | X | X | | |
| Stockholm Radio, Sweden | X | X | X | X | |
| Tingstäde Radio, Sweden | X | X | X | | |
| Karlskrona Radio, Sweden | X | X | X | | |
| Riga Radio, Latvia | X | X | X | | |
| Ventspils Radio, Latvia | X | X | X | | |
| Klaipeda Radio, Lithuania | X | X | X | | |
| Kaliningrad Radio, Russia | X | X | X | | |
| Gdynia Radio, Poland | X | X | X | | |
| Witowo Radio, Poland | X | X | X | X | |
| Szczecin Radio, Poland | X | X | X | | |
| Rügen Radio, Germany | X | X | X | X | |
| Lyngby Radio, Denmark | X | X | X | | X |
| Leningrad Radio, Russia (St. Petersburg Radio) | X | X | X | | |
| Vyborg Radio, Russia | X | | X | | |
On VHF channel 16, Helsinki Radio and MRCC Turku were using the same base stations in Utö, Järsö and Hanko, near the site of the accident. MRSC Turku was also using the Utö base station.
Channel 16 was also being watched by MRSC Mariehamn, MRSC Hanko, coast guard stations in Kökar, Storklubb and Hiittinen and central pilot stations in Nauvo and Hanko, near the site of the accident.
7.3.3 The recorded distress traffic
The facts regarding the distress traffic from the ESTONIA, which was transmitted on VHF channel 16, are based on recordings and log entries regarding the traffic. The distress traffic was initiated by the second officer A. Two minutes later the third officer took over as operator. The initiation of the distress traffic was recorded only by MRSC Turku. Except for the initiation, the distress traffic was recorded by the SILJA SYMPHONY among others. This recording has the best quality.
MRCC Turku had a system that should continuously record all radio traffic on VHF channel 16. However, the equipment did not function properly. Thus, the beginning of the recording primarily contains only its own traffic.
The distress traffic was conducted mainly in either Swedish or Finnish; English was used very little.
The distress traffic started with a call (The Commission names this call as 1st Mayday call and the second one as 2nd Mayday call) which reads as follows: “Mayday Mayday Estonia please”. Shortly afterwards a second call - “Mayday Mayday Silja Europa” - was transmitted.
The Mayday calls were received by 14 ship- and shore-based radio stations (Table 7.2).
Table 7.2 Receiving radio stations and recorded times.
| Radio station | First
Mayday call | Second
Mayday call | Reference |
| Silja Europa | 0120 hrs | yes | log book |
| Anette | 0120 hrs | yes, no time | log book, officer |
| Antares | 0120 hrs | yes no time | extract from log book |
| Silja Symphony | 0122 hrs | 0123 hrs | log book, lookout |
| MRSC Turku | 0123 hrs | 0124 hrs | operator, recording |
| Turku Radio | 0123 hrs | 0125 hrs | operator, radio log |
| MRCC Turku | - | 0124 hrs | operator, radio log |
| Utö coastal fortress | - | 0124 hrs | radio operator, radio log |
| Kökar coast guard station | - | 0124 hrs | radio log |
| Finnjet | - | 0124 hrs | log book |
| MRSC Mariehamn | - | 0125 hrs | radio log |
| Finnmerchant | - | 0130 hrs | second officer |
| Mariella | yes, no time | yes, no time | log book, protocol |
| Garden | - | yes, no time | master |
It is evident from the table that there are considerable differences between the times for recording the two Mayday calls. At least five radio stations, including MRCC Turku, logged the 2nd Mayday call as received at 0124 hrs. Counting backwards in tape recordings from this moment, the most probable time of the 1st Mayday call was just before 0122 hrs. However, this time is uncertain, the margin of error being plus/minus two minutes. Despite the imprecision of this timing, the transcript in Table 7.3 is given second-by-second so that the time difference between different messages can be seen; the relative precision of the timing is good up to the time the tape was turned over.
Table 7.3 The distress traffic.
| Recording by MRSC Turku: |
Relative
time,
min. | Absolute
time,
hr:min.sec | From | To | Transmission |
| -2.05 | 01:21.55 | Estonia | | Mayday Mayday Estonia please (unclear) |
| -1.46 | 01:22.14 | Mariella | Estonia | Estonia, Mariella |
| -1.26 | 01:22.34 | Mariella | Estonia | Estonia, Mariella over |
| Recording by the SILJA SYMPHONY: |
| -0.49 | 01:23.11 | Estonia | | Europa, Estonia, Silja Europa, Estonia |
| -0.41 | 01:23.19 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Estonia this is Silja Europa replying on channel 16. |
| -0.34 | 01:23.26 | Estonia | | Silja Europa |
| -0.27 | 01:23.33 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Estonia this is Silja Europa on channel 16. |
| -0.06 | 01:23.54 | Estonia | | Silja Europa, Viking, Estonia |
| -0.02 | 01:23.58 | Mariella | Estonia | Estonia, Estonia |
| 0.00 | 01:24.00 | Estonia | | Mayday Mayday |
| 0.05 | 01:24.05 | Estonia | | Silja Europa, Estonia |
| 0.07 | 01:24.07 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Estonia, Silja Europa. Are you calling Mayday? |
| 0.28 | 01:24.28 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Estonia, what's going on? Can you reply? |
| 0.31 | 01:24.31 | Estonia | | This is Estonia. Who is it there? Silja Europa, Estonia |
| 0.40 | 01:24.40 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, Estonia this is Silja Europa |
| 0.42 | 01:24.42 | Estonia | Silja Europa | Good morning. Do you speak Finnish? |
| 0.45 | 01:24.45 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, I speak Finnish. |
| 0.46 | 01:24.46 | Estonia | Silja Europa | Yes, we have a problem here now, a bad list to the right side. I believe that it was twenty, thirty degrees. Could you come to our assistance and also ask Viking Line to come to our assistance? |
| 0.58 | 01:24.58 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, Viking Line is just behind us and they surely got the information. Can you give your position? |
| 1.04 | 01:25.04 | Estonia | Silja Europa | …(unclear)…we have black out, we cannot get it now. I cannot say it. |
| 1.12 | 01:25.12 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Okay, understood, we'll take measures. |
| 1.24 | 01:25.24 | Mariella | | Silja Europa, Mariella |
| 1.26 | 01:25.26 | Silja Europa | Mariella | Yes Europa here, Mariella... Mariella this is Europa 16. |
| 1.33 | 01:25.33 | Mariella | Silja Europa | Did you determine their position, is it they who are here on our port side? |
| 1.39 | 01:25.39 | Silja Europa | Mariella | No, I didn't get any position from them, but they must be here in the neighbourhood, they have 20 - 30 degrees starboard list and black out. |
| 1.50 | 01:25.50 | Mariella | Silja Europa | I think that they are on our port side here approximately 45 degrees. |
| 1.56 | 01:25.56 | Silja Europa | Mariella | Okay, yes, I am just waking up the skipper. |
| 2.41 | 01:26.41 | Estonia | | Silja Europa, Estonia |
| 2.44 | 01:26.44 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Estonia, Silja Europa |
| 2.45 | 01:26.45 | Estonia | Silja Europa | Are you coming to assistance? |
| 2.47 | 01:26.47 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, we are. Can you tell me if you have an exact position? |
| 2.50 | 01:26.50 | Estonia | Silja Europa | I cannot say because we have black out here. |
| 2.54 | 01:26.54 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, can you see us, or? |
| 2.57 | 01:26.57 | Estonia | Silja Europa | Yes, I can hear you. |
| 3.01 | 01:27.01 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Okay, we will start to determine your here now. Just a moment. |
| 3.07 | 01:27.07 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, of course we will come to your assistance, but now we have to determine your position. |
| 3.15 | 01:27.15 | Mariella | | Helsinki Radio, Helsinki Radio ...calling on channel 16 ... Helsinki |
| 4.17 | 01:28.17 | Silja Europa | | Mariella, Silja Europa |
| 4.25 | 01:28.25 | Mariella | Silja Europa | Yes, this is Mariella |
| 4.27 | 01:28.27 | Silja Europa | Mariella | Yes, have you any visual contact at all with Estonia? |
| 4.31 | 01:28.31 | Mariella | Silja Europa | No |
| 4.35 | 01:28.35 | Silja Europa | Mariella | We must start and try to find her somewhere, it is a bit difficult to say as they didn't give any position. |
| 4.43 | 01:28.43 | Estonia | | Silja Europa, Estonia |
| 4.45 | 01:28.45 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, Estonia, Silja Europa |
| 4.47 | 01:28.47 | Estonia | Silja Europa | I'll tell you our position now. |
| 4.50 | 01:28.50 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, go ahead. |
| 4.52 | 01:28.52 | Estonia | Silja Europa | 58 latitude, just a moment ... 22 degrees. |
| 5.01 | 01:29.01 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Okay, 22 degrees, understood, we're on our way there. |
| 5.05 | 01:29.05 | Estonia | Silja Europa | So 59 latitude and 22 minutes. |
| 5.16 | 01:29.16 | Silja Europa | Estonia | 59.22 minutes and longitude? |
| 5.19 | 01:29.19 | Estonia | Silja Europa | 21.40 East. |
| 5.23 | 01:29.23 | Silja Europa | Estonia | 21.40 East, okay. |
| 5.27 | 01:29.27 | Estonia | Silja Europa | Really bad, it looks really bad here now. |
| 5.36 | 01:29.36 | Silja Europa | Estonia | Yes, looks bad. We are on our way and it was 21.40. |
| 5.39 | 01:29.39 | Estonia | Silja Europa | ... you said (unclear) |
| 5.42 | 01:29.42 | Silja Europa | Estonia | 48, okay. |
The full text of the distress traffic is in English in Table 7.3. Messages transmitted by the ESTONIA are in bold. For the full transcript of the recordings, see Supplement. After the distress traffic in Table 7.3, the ESTONIA no longer transmits.
Table 7.4 shows times of the other stations' first transmissions on VHF channel 16 in response to the distress of the ESTONIA.
Table 7.4 Other stations’ response times on channel 16.
Relative
time,
min.sec | Absolute
time,
hrs:min.sec | Station |
| 06.49 | 01:30.49 | ANETTE |
| 12.25 | 01:36.25 | FINNJET |
| 16.07 | 01:40.07 | FINNMERCHANT |
| 17.21 | 01:41.21 | Helsinki Radio |
| 19.22 | 01:43.22 | SILJA SYMPHONY |
| 19.30 | 01:43.30 | ISABELLA |
| 20.44 | 01:44.44 | MRCC Turku |
| 32.10 | 01:56.10 | ANTARES |
| 36.37 | 02:00.37 | MASTERA |
7.3.4 EPIRB beacons
No signals from the ESTONIA's EPIRBs were received, for further details see 8.11.
|
|
|
7.5.1 The sea traffic in the area
The mouth of the Gulf of Finland is the busiest maritime area in the northern Baltic Sea. Here the traffic proceeds towards the southern Baltic or west towards Sweden. Cargo vessel traffic in the Archipelago Sea uses primarily the Utö route. In the western part of the northern Baltic, a traffic route goes between Bogskär lighthouse island and Svenska Björn caisson lighthouse to the Gulf of Bothnia. Vessels entering the Gulf of Finland from the southern Baltic take the southern route, north of Hiiumaa and around the Glotov buoy. Vessels proceeding in the opposite direction take a more northerly route, as determined by the traffic separation scheme.
Off Hanko and Hiiumaa, the route selected by passenger ferry traffic between Finland and Sweden in crossing the northern Baltic is determined by weather conditions. The southern, Sandhamn, route is preferred, the northern, Söderarm, route being used in weather conditions unfavourable for the Sandhamn route.
Passenger ferry traffic between Tallinn and Stockholm follows the northern coast of Estonia in the Gulf of Finland. The route alternatives mentioned above are used when crossing the northern Baltic.
That night the sea traffic in the northern Baltic and in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland was lighter than normal. Because of the forecast heavy wind, fishing vessels and coasters had remained in harbour and Russian river vessels had withdrawn to protected anchorages.
All scheduled passenger ferries were at sea. At midnight the four westbound ferries, the ESTONIA included, were in their usual area at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. Two passenger ferries were on an eastbound course north of Bogskär lighthouse. Two cargo ferries were on a westerly course south of Hanko, two cargo vessels were passing Utö lighthouse on their way south and two cargo vessels were between Hiiumaa and Bogskär.
Because of the heavy weather, the coast guard vessel from the Archipelago Sea Coast Guard Section, the TURSAS, had anchored at Örö. Twelve government vessels, three of them Swedish, had been engaged in an oil spill control exercise in the Archipelago Sea near Nauvo but were in the Pärnäinen harbour by the time of the accident. Two mine ferries belonging to the Finnish Defence Forces were near Örö, and a Navy minelayer was at Hanko.
Two coast guard vessels from the Gulf of Finland Coast Guard Section were at sea south-west of Helsinki.
Figure 7.1 shows the positions of the vessels at about the time of the accident.
Figure 7.1 Positions of the vessels at the time of the accident.
Click image for close-up
| Vessel | Type | Operator | Route | Max. no. of
passen-
gers | Gross
tonnage |
| 1. Mariella | Passen-
ger ferry | Viking Line | Helsinki - Stock-
holm | 2 700 | 48 529 |
| 2. Silja Europa | Passen-
ger ferry | Silja Line | Helsinki - Stock-
holm | 3 000 | 59 912 |
| 3. Isabella | Passen-
ger ferry | Viking Line | Stock-
holm - Helsinki | 2 200 | 34 937 |
| 4. Silja Symphony | Passen-
ger ferry | Silja Line | Stock-
holm - Helsinki | 2 700 | 58 376 |
| 5. Finnjet | Passen-
ger ferry | Silja Line | Helsinki - Trave-
münde | 1 686 | 32 940 |
6. Fin-
merchant | Cargo ferry | Finn-
carriers | Kotka - Lübeck | | 21 195 |
7. Finn-
hansa | Cargo ferry | Finn-
carriers | Helsinki - Lübeck | | 32 531 |
| 8. Antares | Cargo ferry | Finn-
carriers | Turku - Lübeck | | 19 963 |
| 9. Anette | Cargo vessel | Bror Husell Charter-
ing | Taalin-
tehdas - Norrkö-
ping | | 569 |
| 10. Garden | Cargo ferry | Engship | Turku - Harwich | | 10 762 |
| 11. Tursas | Coast Guard patrol vessel | Coast Guard | | | |
| 12. Halli | Oil pollution combatt-
ing vessel | Finnish Environ-
ment Institute/ Finnish Navy | | | |
| Hylje | Oil pollution combatt-
ing vessel | Finnish Environ-
ment Institute/ Finnish Navy | | | |
| Svärtan | Oil pollution combatt-
ing vessel | The Govern-
ment of Åland | | | |
| KBV | Oil pollution combatt-
ing vessel | Swedish Coast Guard | | | |
| | Rescue boats | | | | |
| | Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats | Finnish Navy and Finnish Coast Guard | | | |
| | Pilot boat | Finnish Maritime Administ-
ration | | | |
| 13. Russarö | Rescue cruiser | Finnish Life-Boat Society | | | |
| 14. | Various Coast Guard boats | Finnish Coast Guard | | | |
| | Various Pilot vessels | Finnish Maritime Administ-
ration | | | |
7.5.2 General considerations, vessels
The masters' decisions to turn towards the scene of the accident to rescue those in distress also affected the safety of their own vessels, crews, passengers and cargoes. All the masters who received messages about the accident were faced with the same choice. Most decided to proceed to help those in distress, a few vessels received permission to continue their voyage following their request to do so, and one master decided independently not to provide assistance, since he deemed that this would seriously endanger the safety of his vessel and crew.
The first vessels to approach the scene of the accident had to decide independently how best they could help rescue people. The heavy weather prevented, or rendered inadvisable, the lowering of lifeboats or rescue boats. This decision was discussed between the masters. Each vessel prepared to rescue survivors in accordance with her own possibilities. Most lowered rope ladders down the side to the sea. While sailing to the scene of the accident the vessels were made ready to take survivors aboard.
Liferafts were lowered to the sea on wires and then raised again to bring up survivors from the ESTONIA's liferafts. The ISABELLA lowered its rescue slide, and 16 persons were pulled up along it.
In the beginning the search consisted of an attempt to find people and liferafts near the scene of the accident. As dawn broke, the participants grasped the extent of the entire rescue operation.
At 1000 hrs - when no more survivors were found - the vessels proceeded with a systematic search of the area, in formation in the direction of the calculated drift. The vessels reported any victims observed and the helicopters winched them up from the sea. The calculated area, which was patrolled from the air, was searched systematically several times.
Most of the vessels searched the whole day and were released from their duties in the evening. The FINNJET was allowed to leave at 0755 hrs to avoid additional damage caused by the heavy rolling. The ISABELLA, MARIELLA, and SILJA SYMPHONY were released at 1320 hrs. However, as more vessels arrived, the rescue capacity increased.
All merchant vessels, except the SILJA EUROPA, were released at 1832 hrs when darkness fell.
The last vessel to be released was the SILJA EUROPA which left the area at about 2030 hrs, at which time a helicopter picked up the assisting OSC and the air operation co-ordinator and their assistants. Left on the accident scene searching for bodies were government vessels. The SILJA EUROPA was relieved by the TURSAS coastal patrol vessel.
A total of 34 persons were rescued from the ESTONIA's rafts directly to other vessels; the TURSAS rescued one, the MARIELLA 15, the ISABELLA 17 and the SILJA EUROPA one.
7.5.3 Action taken by the vessels
MARIELLA
The passenger ferry MARIELLA was closest to the ESTONIA at the time of the distress signal. She had departed from Helsinki, bound for Stockholm, at 1800 hrs.
The officer of the watch was talking on the telephone with the master about reducing speed when the first Mayday call was received. On learning of the call the master went quickly to the bridge. The vessel was nine nautical miles north-east of the ESTONIA at 0132 hrs when she turned towards the site of the accident. When she was four nautical miles away, the radar image of the ESTONIA disappeared at about 0150 - 0155 hrs.
The MARIELLA was the first vessel to reach the assumed scene of the accident, at 0212 hrs. The master ordered an emergency stop at 0220 hrs so that no people or rafts would run foul of the propellers.
When the vessel arrived on the scene many people could be seen in the sea around the vessel, wearing lifejackets, screaming. In addition, lifeboats and rafts were floating on the surface. The vessel threw some 150 lifejackets into the water and launched four liferafts. The bunker door was opened to provide access for the rescue of persons from the sea, but it had to be closed quickly as waves washed on board.
When no people could be seen around the vessel, the master steered carefully with the starboard side to the wind, from one liferaft to the next. Most of the rafts, however, were empty.
Four open liferafts were winched down into the sea from the MARIELLA so that people on board the ESTONIA's rafts could transfer to these. One of the rafts was secured to the MARIELLA's bow and another to her stern. The area between was used to catch the ESTONIA's rafts. The rafts had to be winched manually from the sea, although two large electric drills were used at the bow to help in this work. In this way 13 persons were brought up from the ESTONIA's rafts.
Those persons on board rafts found after 0500 hrs were so exhausted that they could no longer move from one raft to another unaided. At this stage two crew members of the MARIELLA volunteered to be lowered down to her liferafts. Dressed in rescue suits and secured by rope they managed to pull two persons to their own raft, whence they were winched up to deck 8.
All in all, the MARIELLA rescued 15 persons from the ESTONIA's liferafts.
The MARIELLA continued her own rescue work until dawn, by which time the constantly worsening weather prevented her from keeping one side to the wind. She began to roll so heavily as to endanger the safety of her passengers and cargo.
The vessel turned to the wind and proceeded slowly, searching for liferafts. A report of any rafts sighted was made to the helicopters, which lifted people from the rafts and brought them to the vessels and to land-based assembly points. In this way 11 more persons were rescued, and brought by the OH-HVG helicopter to the MARIELLA at 0657 hrs. These survivors were treated by the vessel's own personnel together with three physicians and 30 nurses among the passengers.
One of the survivors was transferred by helicopter to Hanko for hospital treatment for a broken leg.
At 1320 hrs the MARIELLA received permission to continue to Stockholm. The vessel arrived in Stockholm at 2355 hrs with the 25 survivors.
SILJA EUROPA
The passenger ferry SILJA EUROPA had departed from Helsinki at 1800 hrs, bound for Stockholm. According to the ship's log and the radio log the 1st Mayday call was received at 0120 hrs. The officer of the watch has stated that transmission was poor and he could not identify the name of the ship.
On receiving the Mayday call, the vessel was 10.5 nautical miles north-west of the ESTONIA. Ten minutes after being informed of the ESTONIA's position the master, according to the DGPS recording, started to turn to heading 134° towards the accident site. At this time ESTONIA's radar image could still be discerned. The recording shows that the distance to the ESTONIA was about 12.5 nautical miles when the turn was completed. At 0205 hrs MRCC Turku appointed the master On-Scene Commander (OSC). The SILJA EUROPA arrived at the scene at 0230 hrs.
The master summoned the command group to the bridge in accordance with the vessel's emergency plan. The group consisted of the master, the chief engineer, the chief officer, the hotel manager and the hotel purser to record the events.
By the time the vessel had turned, the radar image had disappeared. For the rest of the way to the scene, the vessel proceeded cautiously, using searchlights to scour the sea. While approaching the area, the vessel was readied for rescue operations and for taking survivors on board.
When the other passenger ferries were approaching the scene, the master, acting as OSC, allocated operational areas and followed on his radar how the vessels were proceeding to the stations allotted to them in the SAR formation. The OSC concentrated on managing the overall situation, and placed his vessel somewhat away from the others.
Two large liferafts were prepared and one of them was winched down to the sea. This, however, soon drifted away, hit by a wave that opened the locking mechanism thereby releasing it. In addition, rope ladders were lowered along the side of the vessel to the sea.
At 0448 hrs, a man who had been alone in a partially waterlogged liferaft managed to climb up a rope ladder. The vessel was steered so that the raft drifted along its side. On seeing the rope ladder reaching down to the water, the man jumped into the sea, swam to the ladder, grasped it and climbed unaided up to the sixth deck
Several liferafts found and examined were all empty. There were many lifejackets floating in the sea, many still packed. The focus of the rescue operations moved eastwards, since the wind and the waves carried those in the water in this direction.
The OSC managed the operations of the vessels and the helicopters, passed on reports from the vessels to the helicopters and maintained contact with MRCC Turku, providing status reports and relaying instructions from MRCC to the vessels and the helicopters. An air operation co-ordinator was flown out to assist the OSC. He was put on board the SILJA EUROPA at 0650 hrs with two 5 W portable aviation radios to control the air operations. At 0945 hrs the Silja Europa received the assistance of a co-ordinator surface search (CSS), his assistant and an air traffic control officer, equipped with a portable 25 W aviation radio. At 1300 hrs two more air traffic control officers boarded the vessel.
To direct the search properly, MRCC Turku telefaxed the OSC at around 0800 hrs information on the currents in the area, drift calculations and the weather forecast. On the basis of this information, the search formation was directed at 1000 hrs to proceed on a course of 100°. It turned around at 1151 hrs when the calculated limit of drift had been reached. In addition, the drift was followed on patrol flights by three maritime surveillance aircraft. The operational areas for the helicopters were determined on the basis of the results of the patrol flights. Empty liferafts were observed to drift in the strong winds considerably beyond the calculated line.
The OSC continued to manage the search until 1832 hrs, at which time all the vessels were informed in Finnish, Swedish and English that the search would be de-escalated. All were thanked for their assistance.
The SILJA EUROPA rescued one survivor. One helicopter brought five survivors and another a wounded Swedish rescue man on the vessel, which arrived in Stockholm on 29 September at 0313 hrs.
SILJA SYMPHONY
The passenger ferry Silja Symphony was on her way from Stockholm to Helsinki. At 0123 hrs she had the Suomen Leijona caisson lighthouse 6.9 nautical miles away on a bearing of 207°. The distance to the ESTONIA was about 25 nautical miles. The Silja Symphony was proceeding on a course of 97° at 21 knots.
After receiving the distress call the lookout watch on the bridge started a tape recorder, at about 0123 hrs.
At 0150 hrs the Silja Symphony changed course to 122° towards the scene of the accident, continuing to maintain full speed. The tailwind and quartering seas, coming from starboard, did not slow the speed.
The vessel reached the scene of the accident at about 0240 hrs and positioned herself upwind from the MARIELLA at a distance of about one nautical mile. She received from the OSC instructions regarding the search and the area of the search.
Liferafts hanging from the wire of a crane were lowered into the sea off the starboard side of the vessel in case one of the ESTONIA's rafts could be brought nearby; the survivors could transfer to the SILJA SYMPHONY's rafts, which could then be winched up.
At 0312 hrs the forward port slide was manned.
Four survivors, hoisted up from liferafts by a helicopter, were brought to the vessel at 0410 hrs and taken for treatment.
At 0620 hrs five survivors and at 0757 hrs eleven survivors and one body were brought on board by the same helicopter.
The Silja Symphony continued, proceeding cautiously and searching for liferafts carrying survivors. At 1320 hrs she received permission to continue to Helsinki, where she arrived at 1848 hrs with 20 survivors and one body.
ISABELLA
The passenger ferry Isabella was sailing from Stockholm to Helsinki. At 2400 hrs she passed the Svenska Björn caisson lighthouse at 4.4 nautical miles on a bearing of 187°.
Unlike the above-mentioned vessels the ISABELLA did not pick up the distress call from the ESTONIA. At about 0150 hrs the crew on watch saw the Silja Europa change course to cross her line of course. At the same time the Silja Symphony, which was proceeding to the north of the ISABELLA, announced on VHF that she was changing her course towards the ESTONIA and would therefore have to pass ahead of the ISABELLA. On being informed that the ESTONIA was in distress, the officer of the watch of the ISABELLA turned his vessel towards the reported scene of the accident, 17 nautical miles away.
According to the ISABELLA's master, the vessel arrived at the scene of the accident at about 0252 hrs. At this time the propellers were stopped and the vessel was allowed to drift together with the MARIELLA nearby. The ISABELLA was instructed to begin the search south of the MARIELLA. While drifting the starboard side was to the wind.
At 0314 hrs the vessel winched one of her own liferafts down to the sea. The bunker door was opened, but had to be closed due to heavy seas. Ten minutes later a second raft was lowered with two voluntary rescue men from the ship. On reaching the sea they rescued a swimmer with a lifejacket. He was transferred to their raft, which was then winched up at 0445 hrs.
The next ESTONIA raft came near the ISABELLA at 0530 hrs. The master steered the vessel so that three voluntary rescue men who had been lowered in one of the Isabella's rafts were able to get hold of it. About 20 people on board the raft were transferred to the Isabella's raft. When the crew of the Isabella tried to winch up this raft, it was too heavy because of the number of people in it and water poured into it. The raft tore in the process and filled with water, upon which at least two of the survivors and the three rescue men fell into the sea. A helicopter called to the scene lifted up one survivor who was hanging on to a lifebuoy, and the three rescue men. All four were brought to Hanko. At least one of the persons who had fallen into the sea disappeared. The sixteen survivors still on the damaged raft were pulled one by one up the slide and into the vessel.
A helicopter winched one survivor in deep hypothermia from the Isabella at 0905 hrs and flew him to a hospital in Turku.
The vessel continued her search in the vicinity of the accident site until 1320 hrs, when the OSC gave her permission to continue her voyage to Helsinki, where she arrived at 1900 hrs.
The ISABELLA rescued 17 persons of whom 16 were taken to Helsinki.
FINNJET
The gas turbine passenger ferry FINNJET departed from Helsinki for Travemünde in Germany at 1900 hrs. Her average speed was about 16 knots, and she was using her diesel engines. On receiving the Mayday call at 0124 hrs, the FINNJET was about 23 nautical miles east of the ESTONIA.
The FINNJET turned towards the scene of the accident at 0133 hrs on a heading of 276°. At first she proceeded with her diesel engines running at a speed of 15 knots, but at 0215 hrs the gas turbines were started in order to improve manoeuvrability.
According to the master's report the vessel arrived at the scene of the accident at 0320 hrs.
To keep the rolling to a tolerable level, the Finnjet proceeded at 5 - 7 knots during the search. When changing course, the vessel rolled so heavily that the crew feared that the cargo would start to shift. Several passenger cars shifted and were damaged, and one almost fell from the vessel's hoistable car deck.
During the search the vessel reported to the OSC three rafts containing survivors.
At the beginning of the rescue operation the officers on the bridge worked actively to get helicopters alarmed quickly and involved in the rescue. Because of the continuously worsening weather and to prevent further damage, the vessel requested permission from the OSC to continue her voyage to Travemünde. The OSC gave this permission at 0755 hrs, and it was confirmed by MRCC Turku ten minutes later.
No survivors were rescued from the sea or brought to the vessel from helicopters.
FINNMERCHANT
The cargo ferry FINNMERCHANT sailing from the Gulf of Finland to Lübeck in Germany received parts of the distress traffic. The crew called up the Silja Europa at about 0145 hrs and received instructions to proceed to the scene of the accident. The vessel's speed to the scene was about 15 knots and she arrived at 0325 hrs.
On approaching, her master reported to the OSC that, because of the rough seas, the vessel would not be able to lift survivors from the water.
All liferafts observed were reported to the OSC. The first liferafts were observed already on her arrival. When the OSC asked whether any persons could be seen in the liferafts, the master tried to steer the FINNMERCHANT as close as possible to the rafts so that they could be well lit with searchlights. However, there was not enough time to examine all the liferafts in this way, since manoeuvring was difficult. When the coast guard patrol vessel TURSAS reached the scene, the two vessels worked together, the Finnmerchant lighting up the rafts and the more manoeuvrable Tursas checking for survivors. The vessel continued the search throughout the entire day, and was released at 1832 hrs, at which time she continued her voyage to Lübeck.
No survivors were rescued from the sea or brought to the vessel from helicopters.
FINNHANSA
The passenger/ro-ro cargo vessel Finnhansa, which had departed at 2000 hrs from Helsinki bound for Lübeck was south of Hanko at about 0130 hrs. Some 30 minutes later she slowed from 18 knots to 15 due to the heavy head wind and waves.
The distress radio traffic was not heard until at about 0245 hrs, when she was closing to 25 nautical miles of the scene of the accident. When her master had been called to the bridge, the course was altered towards the scene and speed increased. Because of the head wind and the high waves however, speed soon had to be reduced again to 10 - 12 knots. At about 0430 hrs the vessel arrived at the scene of the accident.
On approaching the scene, she was requested by the OSC to search for people in the water and rafts, locate them precisely and report these to OSC so that they could be picked up by helicopters. Several rafts were seen; most were empty, but a few were observed to hold survivors. There were also some capsized liferafts as well as water-filled or capsized lifeboats. No survivors were rescued from the sea or brought to the vessel from helicopters.
At 1832 hrs she received permission to continue her voyage to Lübeck.
TURSAS
The coast guard patrol vessel TURSAS, alerted at 0130 hrs, was ordered to proceed to the scene of the accident, where she arrived at 0500 hrs. At 0615 hrs a survivor was found on the second raft examined and brought aboard the vessel. The survivor had an injured hip and slight hypothermia. When the body temperature of the rescued person began to increase, he started to complain of pain in the hip. A helicopter was summoned to the vessel, but was unable to winch the patient aboard. At 0800 hrs a body was found in a water-filled raft, but could not be recovered to the vessel despite several attempts. (On co-operation with the Finnmerchant, see above.)
Towards the end of the search the TURSAS together with the minelayer UUSIMAA and the coast guard patrol vessels KIISLA and VALPAS were left in the area. The master of the TURSAS was appointed CSS at 1850 hrs. By this time the vessel had inspected 25 liferafts.
A new attempt to winch up the injured person to a helicopter failed and at 1950 hrs the TURSAS got permission to take the rescued man to Hanko for medical care.
The vessel returned to sea and the master acted as CSS in the area also on 29 and 30 September, participating in the search for victims. Several bodies as well as debris were found. After this the TURSAS changed crew and continued its mission until 3 October. The TURSAS rescued one person.
MINI STAR
The cargo ship Mini Star, proceeding from Kiel in Germany to Kotka in Finland, was 35 nautical miles SSW of the ESTONIA and arrived at the scene of the accident at about 0430 hrs. She was assigned the task of searching the area at her master's own discretion. The vessel was also instructed to go near liferafts that had been observed in order to check whether there were any people on board. At 0510 hrs motion was observed on board a liferaft. When it had been secured to the vessel with a line, two persons were seen on board. It proved impossible to bring them on board the vessel because of the heavy rolling - up to 45 degrees. Then a pilot ladder hanging down from the side was brought near the raft so that they could try to climb up. A man on board the raft failed several times to climb up. He did not understand the instructions shouted to him to wait calmly for a helicopter. When he made a new attempt, a wave washed him into the sea, where he disappeared. A helicopter arrived at 0520 hrs and brought up the second survivor from the raft.
The vessel continued its search until 1830 hrs, when she was given permission to continue her voyage to Kotka.
Final remarks
Two hours after the ESTONIA sank, 6 vessels had reached the scene of the accident. By 1600 hrs, 29 vessels had arrived to carry out a surface search. The times of arrival are given in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6 Times of arrival.
| 0212 hrs | Mariella, passenger/cargo ro-ro ferry, |
| 0230 hrs | SILJA EUROPA, passenger/cargo ro-ro ferry, |
| 0240 hrs | Silja Symphony, passenger/cargo ro-ro ferry, |
| 0252 hrs | Isabella, passenger/cargo ro-ro ferry, |
| 0320 hrs | Finnjet, passenger/cargo ro-ro ferry, |
| 0325 hrs | Finnmerchant, ro-ro cargo, |
| 0430 hrs | Finnhansa, passenger/ro-ro cargo, |
| 0430 hrs | Mini Star, ro-ro cargo, |
| 0500 hrs | Tursas, patrol vessel, |
| 0510 hrs | Ingrid Gorthon, pallets carrier, |
| 0700 hrs | Uusimaa, minelayer, |
| 0811 hrs | Arkadia, bulk carrier, |
| 0919 hrs | Bremer Uranus, general cargo, |
| 0945 hrs | Rakvere, general cargo, |
| 1015 hrs | MAERSK EURO TERTIO, container ship, |
| 1018 hrs | VALPAS, patrol vessel, |
| 1045 hrs | CRYSTAL PEARL, tanker, |
| 1053 hrs | MICHEL, general cargo, |
| 1158 hrs | WESTÖN, ro-ro cargo, |
| 1220 hrs | KIISLA, patrol vessel, |
| 1258 hrs | BERGÖN, general cargo, |
| 1305 hrs | FINNFIGHTER, general cargo, |
| 1349 hrs | PETSAMO, general cargo, |
| 1415 hrs | UISKO, patrol vessel, |
| 1427 hrs | NAVIGIA, general cargo, |
| 1431 hrs | BALANGA QUEEN, passenger/cargo ro-ro ferry, |
| 1455 hrs | CORTIA, ro-ro cargo, |
| 1458 hrs | RANKKI, tanker, |
| 1502 hrs | TIIRA, tanker. |
Continues... |
|
